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Previous Volume 345:1423-1424 November 8, 2001 Number 19 Next

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To the Editor: Drs. Khan and Ashford, in their editorial (July 26 issue),¹ argue that the case of glanders in a microbiologist working in a military laboratory, reported by Srinivasan et al. in the same issue,² suggests the need for expanded preparedness for bioterrorism. We disagree. The lesson should instead be a warning that current "preparedness programs" are actually dangerous diversions of resources and that there is a need for primary prevention of all uses of biologic weapons. The microbiologist was not a victim of terrorism. He was an accidental casualty of the growing, multibillion-dollar preparedness programs and of failure . . . [Full Text of this Article]

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